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Republican Citizenship
RICHARD DAGGER

To speak of republican citizenship is to risk
confusion, at least in the United States,
where it is often necessary to explain that
one is referring to 'small-r' republicanism
rather than a position taken by the Republican Party. But just as one may be a democrat
without being a Democrat, so one may be a
republican without being a Republican. The
ideas of democracy and the republic are far
older than any political party and far richer
than any partisan label can convey - rich
enough to make the use of 'republican' here
worth the risk of some initial confusion.
'Republican' and 'citizen', in fact, are old
and intertwined words - so old that some
may wonder at their relevance in the brave
new world of the twenty-first century, and
so intertwined that the phrase 'republican
citizenship' seems almost redundant to
others. There is no republic without citizens,
after all; and, according to the classical
republican thinkers, there is no citizenship,
in the full sense of the word, except among
those who are fortunate enough to inhabit a
republic. But this view of citizenship's connection to republicanism no longer seems to
prevail. If it did, there would be no need for
a chapter on republican citizenship in this
volume of essays on citizenship, for the
authors would simply assume that citizenship entails republicanism and go on to
other matters.

There might also be no need for this
chapter if it were not for the revival of
scholarly interest in republicanism in recent
years. Such a revival has definitely
occurred, though, and occurred simultaneously with a renewed interest in citizenship.
This coincidence suggests that republican
citizenship is well worth our attention, not
only for purposes of historical understanding but also as a way of thinking about
citizenship in the twenty-first century. Why
this revival has occurred and whether republican citizenship truly offers anything of
relevance or value today are thus the subjects
of this chapter.
The first subject, however, must be
republicanism itself. Rather than attempt to
survey the long, varied, and often contested
history of republicanism - a task undertaken
recently by Oldfield (1990), Rahe (1992),
Sellers (1998) and others - I begin by trying
to distill something of the spirit and forms of
republicanism into a brief but historically
sensitive account. The second part of the
chapter then shifts the emphasis to citizenship by explaining, from the republican
standpoint, its value. Part three takes up the
revival of interest in republicanism and
citizenship in the last quarter century or so,
and the fourth section concludes the chapter
with a defense of the continuing relevance
of the republican conception of citizenship.
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REPUBLICANISM

'Republic' derives from the Latin res
publica, the public thing, matter, business, or
property, with the implication that a republic
differs from a state or society in which the
rulers regard everything, including the
people who inhabit it, as their property. 1 In a
republic, that is, the government of the state
or society is a public matter, and the people
rule themselves. Publicity - the condition of
being open and public rather than private or
personal - and self-government thus seem to
be the essential elements of republicanism.
But what exactly do publicity and selfgovernment entail? What is 'the public', and
how are its members to govern themselves?
There is no single republican answer to
these questions. In ancient times, and long
beyond, republicans typically assumed that
the public comprised the citizenry, and only
property-owning, arms-bearing men could
be citizens. Contemporary republicans
define the public and citizenship more
expansively, however, to include women
and people without property, and nothing in
the idea of republicanism prevents them
from doing so. Similar shifts have occurred
with regard to self-government. When they
designed representative institutions for the
new republic, for example, the men who
drafted the US Constitution knew that they
were departing from the classical conception
of self-government as direct participation in
rule; yet they saw this as an improvement
within, not an abandonment of, republican
practice. Whether they were right to think so,
or whether they sacrificed too much participation and relied too heavily on representation, remains a point of contention. But it
is the commitment to publicity and selfgovernment that generates this and other
intramural disputes among republicans. For
republicans, the question is not whether publicity and self-government are good things; it
is how best to achieve them.
One could say the same, of course, about
liberals, conservatives, socialists, and others
who claim to promote government of the

people, by the people, and for the people.
Publicity and self-government may be the
essential elements of republicanism, but
they are not peculiar to it. To the extent that
they stress the importance of publicity and
self-government, however, modem political
theories do so because they draw upon the
legacy of classical republicanism. To the
extent that they differ from one another and from republicanism - it is because they
pursue the implications of publicity and selfgovemment in different ways. Thus writers
such as William Sullivan (1986), Michael
Sandel ( 1996), and Philip Pettit (1997)
maintain that liberalism gives too much
attention to privacy and individual rights
and too little to fostering the public virtues
that lead people to do their duties as citizens.
Liberals and republicans both want to promote self-government, according to Pettit,
but liberals make the mistake of thinking
that all forms of restraint deprive people of
freedom - even, as we shall see, the
restraints imposed by a legal system that
prevent some people from ruling or dominating others. There is, then, a neo-republican
school of thought that sees liberalism as a
misguided rival of republicanism. To others
with republican sympathies, these differences are more a matter of emphasis than of
fundamental commitments. One may be a
republican and a liberal, on this view, and
there are reasons to think that republican
liberalism is an especially attractive political philosophy.2 Still, to speak of republican
liberalism is to acknowledge, first, that
republicanism and liberalism are not one and
the same, and, second, that there are more
and less republican forms of liberalism.
To understand what is distinctive about
republicanism, then, we must look more
closely at the implications republicans draw
from publicity and self-government.
In the case of publicity, the implications
are twofold. The first is that politics, as the
public's business, must be conducted
openly, in public. The second is that 'the
public' is not only a group of people but an
aspect or sphere of life with its own claims
and considerations, even if it is not easily
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distinguished from the private. What makes
something public is that it involves people
as members of a community or polity - as
people joined by common concerns that take
them out of their private lives and beyond,
as Tocqueville put it in Democracy in
America ([1835] 1969: 506), 'the circle of
family and friends'. One need not go as far
in this regard as Aristotle - or as Aristotle as
read by Hannah Arendt (1958: esp. Part 11)but all republicans believe that there is
something enriching about public life,
regardless of how wearisome it sometimes
may be. Public life draws people out, and it
draws them together. It draws out their
talents and capacities, and it draws them
together into community - into connection
and solidarity, and occasionally conflict, with
other members of the public.3 No matter how
desirable they may seem to others, neither a
life of unfettered individualism nor one
devoted exclusively to family and friends
will appeal to a republican.
From these aspects of publicity follow the
republican emphasis on the rule of law and,
perhaps most distinctively, civic virtue. The
public business must be conducted in public
not only for reasons of convenience - literally, of coming together - but also in order
to guard against corruption. As members of
the public, people must be prepared to overcome their personal inclinations and set
aside their private interests when necessary
to do what is best for the public as a whole.
The public-spirited citizens who act in this
way display public or civic virtue. If they
are to manifest this virtue, furthermore, the
public must be bound by the rule of law.
Because it is the public's business, politics
requires public debate and decisions, which
in tum require regular, established procedures - that is, rules about who may speak,
when they may speak, and how decisions
are to be reached. Decisions must then take
the form of promulgated rules or decrees
that guide the conduct of the members of the
public. From the insistence on publicity, the
rule of law quickly follows. 4
The connection of self-government to the
rule oflaw is at least as strong and immediate.
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If citizens are to be self-governing, they
cannot be subject to absolute or arbitrary
rule. If the citizen is to be self-governing,
then he or she must be free from the
absolute or arbitrary rule of others. To avoid
this arbitrariness, citizens must be subject to
the rule of law - the government of laws, not
of men, in what was the standard formula. 5
But it is also important to note that selfgovemment requires self-governing. The
republican citizen is not someone who acts
arbitrarily, impulsively, or recklessly, but
according to laws he or she has a voice in
making. Again, the need for the rule of law
is evident.
As with publicity, the republican commitment to self-government leads to characteristic republican themes, such as the
republican conception of freedom and, again,
of civic virtue. Self-government is, of
course, a form of freedom. For republicans,
it is the most important form, for other
forms of individual freedom are secure only
in a free state, under law. Freedom thus
requires dependence upon the law so that
citizens may be independent of the arbitrary
will of others. In Pettit's tenns, republicans
are less concerned with freedom from interference than with freedom from domination
(1997). 6 It is not interference as such that is
objectionable but its arbitrariness. A slave
and a citizen may both suffer interference
when the former must bow to the will of the
master and the latter must bow to the law, but
their conditions are hardly equivalent. The
master need not consider the slave's desires
or interests, but the law, at least in the ideal,
must attend to the interests of the citizen even
when it interferes with his or her actions.
Because it protects the citizen against arbitrary, unaccountable power, the law is 'the
non-mastering interferer' that ensures the
citizen's freedom (Pettit, 1997: 41 ).
The law only ensures the citizen's freedom,
however, when it is responsive to the citizenry
and when the republic itself is secure and
stable enough for its laws to be effective.
Sustaining freedom under the rule of law thus
requires not only active and public-spirited
participation in public affairs - the civic
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virtue of the republican citizen - but also the
proper form of government. This will be
some version of mixed or balanced government, so called because it mixes and
balances elements of rule by one, rule by the
few, and rule by the many. As Pocock (1975)
and others have noted, writers from Polybius
and Cicero to Machiavelli and the American
founders celebrated the mixed constitution
for its ability to stave off corruption and
tyranny. Monarchy, aristocracy, and rule by
the people are prone, according to these writers, to degenerate into tyranny, oligarchy, and
mob rule, respectively; but a government that
disperses power among the three elements
could prevent either the one, the few, or the
many from pursuing its own interest at the
expense of the common good. With each
element holding enough power to check the
others, the result should be a free, stable, and
long-lasting government.
If the mixed constitution is the characteristic form of the republic, civic virtue is its
desired substance. Without citizens who are
willing to defend the republic against
foreign threats and to take an active part in
its government, even the mixed constitution
will fail. Republics must thus engage in
what Sandel (1996: 6) calls 'a formative
politics . . . that cultivates in citizens the
qualities of character that self-government
requires'. Constitutional safeguards may be
necessary to resist corruption in the forms of
avarice, ambition, luxury, and idleness, but
they will not suffice to sustain freedom
under the rule of law in the absence of a significant degree of virtue among the citizens.
Seeing to the continuing supply of civic
virtue through education and other means
will be, accordingly, one of the principal
concerns of a prudent republic.
A prudent republic will also be a small
one. That, at least, has been the conclusion or presumption - of many republicans
throughout the centuries. 'In a large republic', as Montesquieu explained in 1748 in
The Spirit ofthe Laws (Book VIII, Chap. 16),
'the common good is sacrificed to a thousand
considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small

one, the public good is better felt, better
known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses
are less extensive and consequently less
protected'. So widespread was this view in
the late eighteenth century, and so fierce the
insistence that only a small polity can sustain a republic, that the American authors of
the Federalist found it necessary to point out
that Montesquieu had also allowed for the
possibility of a 'federal' - or 'coNFEDERJ\ TE',
according to Federalist 9 - republic. Even
then, the debate over the proposed constitution often turned on the question of whether
the United States would become a 'federal'
or a 'compound' republic - a republic comprising thirteen or more smaller republics or whether it would become a 'consolidated'
republic that could not long preserve its
republican character.
A small republic or a large (con)federal
republic: these seem to be the only alternatives that the republican tradition allows.
The concern for size and civic virtue that
these alternatives reflect testifies to the
republican belief that citizens must have a
strong attachment to their polity that grows
out of a connection to their fellow citizens.
This connection must work almost immediately, as in the city-republic, or in buildingblock fashion, with the higher and more
remote layers of government resting on the
local ones, as in the federal republic. Without
some connection of this sort, civic virtue will
not flourish and self-government will not
survive. Neither will the form of citizenship
that some have regarded as its only true form.

THE VALUE OF REPUBLICAN
CITIZENSHIP

'We have physicists, geometricians, chemists,
astronomers, poets, musicians, and painters
in plenty; but we have no longer a citizen
among us'. So wrote Jean-Jacques Rousseau
in his Discourse on the Arts and Sciences
(Rousseau, [ 1750] 1950: 169). His lament
echoes today in the writings of those who
deplore the decline or loss of 'real' or 'true'
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citizenship - especially in the United States
and other countries where worries about
declining electoral participation and eroding
'social capital' abound (e.g. Putnam, 2000).
Consciously or not, these laments bespeak a
desire for a revival of republican citizenship.
From the republican point of view,
citizenship has an ethical as well as a legal
dimension. If it did not, Rousseau's lament
would make no sense in a world where more
and more people hold the legal title of citizen. If the lament does make sense, it is
because we continue to regard citizenship,
in republican fashion, as an ethos - a way of
life. Citizenship may be a matter of legal
status that confers various privileges and
immunities on the citizen, in other words,
but it must be more than that. 'Real' or
'true' citizenship requires commitment to
the common good and active participation in
public affairs. It requires civic virtue.
That is not to say that republicans denigrate the legal aspect of citizenship. On
the contrary, the citizen of a community
governed by the rule of law must be someone who holds the legal rights and duties of
membership. To say that Joan Smith or Juan
Sosa is a citizen of a republic is to say that
Smith or Sosa not only enjoys the protection
of its laws but is also subject to them. It is
also to say that, as a citizen, Smith or Sosa
is supposed to be on an equal footing with
other citizens. If Smith or Sosa is not treated
equally under the law, then she or he may
rightly complain of being a 'second-class
citizen'. In these respects, legal status is as
necessary to the republican conception of
citizenship as to any other.
Necessary but not sufficient, for it
requires the supplement of the ethical
dimension. This ethical aspect of citizenship
is evident in the theory and practice of the
Greeks and Romans who bequeathed us the
concepts of citizenship and republic.
'Citizen', of course, derives from the Latin
civis, or member of the civitas (city-state);
the Latin tenns parallel the Greek polites
and polis. In ancient Greece and Rome the
citizen was a full member of the community.
Every other member - whether woman,
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child, slave, or resident alien - was subject to
the laws, and might even enjoy some rights
under them, but only the citizen had the right
to take part in the government of the
community. Not only was the citizen entitled
to engage in civic affairs, he was expected to
do so. In ancient Athens, this could mean
that a citizen would have to devote the better
part of his time and energy to public
concerns, such as serving on a jury for a full
year. Such devotion was necessary if he
was to achieve the ideal of citizenship: to be
a self-governing member of a self-governing
community. Those who preferred a more
private or less arduous life than the citizen's
could find themselves mocked, as they
were in Pericles' Funeral Oration, as 'good
for nothing' (Thucydides, [431--41 lBCE]
1993: 42). Indeed, the Greeks drew a contrast
between the polites, the citizen expected to
play a part in public affairs, and the idiotes,
the private person who could not or would not
meet this expectation.
That we no longer regard 'citizen' and
'idiot' as opposites may be a measure of
how far we have departed from the classical
ideal of citizenship. Even so, there is plenty
of evidence to suggest that the ethical
dimension of citizenship persists. There is,
for instance, the fact that we sometimes
characterize people as good or bad citizens.
If citizenship were only a matter of legal
status, we would not be able to distinguish
'good' citizens from 'bad', or 'true' citizens
from those who are citizens 'in name only'.
This point is brought home by those who
insist that 'every citizen holds office'
(Kennedy, 1961; Zwiebach, 1975: 87; van
Gunsteren, 1998: 25). That is, citizens hold
a position of public responsibility, just as
mayors, senators, city councillors, and
members of parliament do. The citizen who
does not act responsibly may thus be said to
betray a public trust, while the citizen who
faithfully does his or her duty displays civic
virtue. Citizenship has an ethical dimension,
in short, because there arc standards built
into the concept of citizenship, just as there
are standards built into the concepts of
mayor, teacher, plumber, and physician. In
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the case of citizenship, moreover, these are
republican standards, for they stress the
public nature of citizenship.
This public nature manifests itself in two
ways. The first is that the good citizen is a
public-spirited person who places the interests of the community ahead of personal
interests. Such a person will recognize that
citizenship is a matter of responsibilities as
much as rights, and the good citizen
will discharge these responsibilities when
called upon to do so - from the day-to-day
demands of obeying traffic laws and respecting the rights of others to the more onerous
burdens of paying taxes and providing military (or some alternative) service. The
second way in which this commitment to the
public good manifests itself is in civic
involvement. Good citizens will undertake
public responsibilities when called upon, as
with jury duty, but they will not always wait
for others to issue the call. Instead, they will
take an active part in public affairs. They
need not be 'political junkies' who have
little interest in any other area of life; they
may even share Oscar Wilde's concern that
'socialism [or any political cause] takes too
many evenings'. But the good citizen will
not think that an occasional evening devoted
to public affairs is one too many, nor that
politics is a nuisance to be avoided or a spectacle to be witnessed. Politics is the public's
business, and the good citizen, according to
the republican view, will try to play a wellinformed and public-spirited part in the conduct of this business.
The republican standards embedded in
the ethical dimension of citizenship thus
provide an ideal of what a citizen should be.
Like other ideals, however, republican citizenship can take more or less stringent
forms. At its most stringent, the republican
conception seems to demand unquestioning
loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizen.
The Spartan mother who supposedly told
her son to come back a hero from the war or
to come back on his shield gave voice to this
view. In its less stringent forms, the republican conception acknowledges that even
good citizens should not forsake self-interest

altogether. Tocqueville articulated this
position when he praised the doctrine of
'self-interest properly understood'. Paying
taxes, serving on juries, obeying the law,
and attending to public affairs require the
sacrifice of time, attention, and treasure, but
such sacrifices are necessary if we are to preserve republican government and continue to
enjoy the rights of the citizen. 7 The doctrine
of 'self-interest properly understood' may
not inspire extraordinary deeds or heroic sacrifices, Tocqueville admitted, 'but every day
it prompts some small ones; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous, but its discipline
shapes a lot of orderly, temperate, moderate,
careful, and self-controlled citizens. If it does
not lead the will directly to virtue, it establishes habits which unconsciously tum it that
way' ([1835-40] 1969: 526-7).
As Tocqueville's remarks suggest, the
person who acquires the habits of the publicspirited citizen is also likely to become a
better, more virtuous person in other
respects. To appreciate how this can happen,
we need to examine two further dimensions
of republican citizenship: the integrative
and the educative.
Republicans believe that citizenship provides 'an integrative experience which
brings together the multiple role activities of
the contemporary person and demands that
the separate roles be surveyed from a more
general point of view' (Wolin, 1960: 434).
When we act as (republican) citizens, we
cannot simply speak or vote as parents or
workers or consumers or members of this
group or that sect. A policy that will work to
one's benefit as a consumer may work to
one's detriment as a worker or parent, for
instance, so the search for a more synoptic
understanding of one's interests becomes
necessary. According to Rousseau, one
should simply set aside personal interests to
follow the general will one has as a citizen that is, as one who has no interests except as a
member of the public ([ 1762] 1950, Book II,
Chs. 1-4). But we cannot truly act as
members of the public unless we have some
understanding of the personal interests of
the people involved. The activity of
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citizenship - the exchange of views, the
give-and-take of debate - helps to provide
this understanding. Indeed, the activity of
citizenship performs an integrative function
in two respects: it enables the individual
to integrate the various roles he or she
plays, and it integrates individuals into the
community.
Assuming that citizenship does in fact
provide this integrative experience, one may
still wonder how this helps someone to
become a better person. The answer is that it
instills a more secure sense of self, of one's
identity and integrity as a person. One of the
most common complaints about modem
society is that life tends to be divided into a
series of almost discrete compartments. We
leave home to go to work, where the division of labor often confines us to a narrow
and repetitive task; we leave work to go
shopping, where we encounter people we
know only as clerks and customers; we
leave the store to drive or ride home, seldom
seeing a familiar face along the way. Modem,
urban society presents a far greater range of
opportunities than earlier forms of society,
but it also separates people from one another
and splits their lives into fragments (Wirth,
1938). To the extent that active citizenship
requires people to see themselves as more
than the sum of the various roles they play,
it will work to establish a secure sense of
self. Anyone who finds this desirable will
thus have good reason to believe that the
integrative aspects of citizenship will be, at
least in the long term, of personal benefit.
Of course, there are other ways to deal
with the multiplicity of roles and the fragmentation of identity characteristic of
modem life. One way is to withdraw into a
cave; another is to join an all-embracing
community of like-minded people. Yet
another is to concentrate, so far as the insistent demands of modem life will allow, on a
single role - parent, perhaps, or soldier or
scholar - to the virtual exclusion of all
others. From the republican standpoint.
however, citizenship offers a better alternative because it promises an educative as well
as an integrative experience.
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Perhaps the best way to make this point is
in terms of a distinction Dennis Thompson
draws between Rousseau's 'patriotic' and
John Stuart Mill's 'enlightened' conception
of citizenship (Thompson, 1976: 43-50).
For Rousseau's austere republicanism, the
true citizen puts the good of the community
above all other considerations. Citizenship
demands simplicity- a whole-hearted devotion to duty - rather than sophistication. For
Mill's liberal republicanism, however, good
citizens are people who develop their faculties through active engagement in public
life. As Mill argues in Representative
Government, the individual stands to gain
from the intellectual growth, the practical
discipline, and
the moral part of the instruction
afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public
functions. He is called upon, while so
engaged, to weigh interests not his own;
to be guided, in case of conflicting
claims, by another rule than his private
partialities; to apply, at every tum, principles and maxims which have for their
reason of existence the common good:
and he usually finds associated with him
in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and
operations, whose study it will be to
supply reasons to his own understanding, and stimulation to his feelings for
the general interest. He is made to feel
himself one of the public, and whatever
is for their benefit to be for his benefit.
(Mill, [1861] 1975: 196-7)
On Mill's account, then, active citizenship educates people by drawing out abilities that might otherwise remain untapped or
unfulfilled, Because these abilities will
prove valuable in other aspects of the
citizens' lives as well, the educative dimension of citizenship clearly promises to work
to their benefit.
Two other features of this educative
dimension are noteworthy. Both pertain to
'the moral part of the instruction' afforded
by pmiicipation in public affairs. The first
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is that this part1c1pation leads individuals
to Tocqueville's doctrine of 'self-interest
properly understood'. For reasons Mill set
out, active citizenship widens individuals'
horizons and deepens their sense of how their
lives are involved with others', including the
lives of people who are unknown to them. In
this way participation works to overcome
individualism as Tocqueville understood it:
'a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the
mass of his fellows and withdraw into the
circle of family and friends; with this little
society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves
the greater society to look after itself
([1835--40] 1969: 506). Republican citizenship works to overcome this pernicious form
of individualism by fostering the individual's
sense of himself or herself as a part of, rather
than apart from, the public.
It is also important to notice how participation encourages public-spirited citizenship. The legal dimension of citizenship
inclines us to think of citizenship in categorical terms: either one is a citizen of a certain
polity or one is not. From the ethical perspective, however, one can be more or less
of a citizen - a 'real' citizen, a citizen 'in
name only', or something in between. Mill's
insight is that real citizenship can be cultivated by encouraging those who are citizens
in name only to join in public life. From
modest beginnings in occasional activities
that require one to 'weigh interests not
his own' and to look beyond 'his private
partialities', political participation can transform the nominal citizen into one who,
'made to feel himself one of the public', is
moved to act by the desire to promote the
common good. Participation in public life
thus seems to be a pathway to, as well as a
defining feature of, republican citizenship.
REVIVING REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP

The belief that participation in public life is
neither as extensive nor as intensive as it
ought to be is largely responsible for the

recent revival of interest in both citizenship
and republicanism. The complaint is not so
much that civic life in the advanced democracies has declined dramatically from some
golden age as that it has failed to realize the
promise of republican citizenship. This
complaint, for instance, animated the work
of Hannah Arendt in the middle of the
twentieth century. Technology has eased the
burdens of labor and freed people to act as
citizens in the public realm, she argued in
The Human Condition (1958), yet we tum
away from public life and toward private
consumption. We want governments to provide for the welfare of the citizenry, she
declared in On Revolution, but we 'deny the
very existence of public happiness and
public freedom' as we 'insist that politics is
a burden .. .' (1965: 273). We are, in short,
squandering an opportunity to achieve what
the republicans of ancient Greece and Rome
thought impossible - a polity in which the
freedom of republican self-government is
available not only to the well-to-do few but
to almost the entire people.
Similar concerns lie behind the republican revival of the last quarter-century or so.
In this case, neo-republicans tend to place
the blame on one, or both, of two theories
they regard as pernicious. One of these is
liberalism; the other is the tendency to
reduce politics to the market place.
According to such critics as Sandel ( 1982,
1996), Sullivan ( 1986), Pettit ( 1997), and
Barber (1984 ), the liberal emphasis on individual rights and liberties has worked to
loosen civic bonds and undermine selfgovemment. As Sandel puts it, 'the civic or
formative aspect of our [American] politics
has largely given way to the liberalism that
conceives persons as free and independent
selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties
they have not chosen' (1996: 6). This 'voluntarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found
in the works of liberal philosophers such as
John Rawls (1971, 1993) and the legal decisions of liberal jurists, has fostered a society
in which individuals fail to understand how
much they owe to the community. The chief
purpose of the state, accordingly, is to
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arbitrate the conflicting claims of these
individuals as they pursue their disparate
conceptions of the good life. Such a society
will be self-subverting, Sandel insists, for it
'fails to capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose moral force consists partly
in the fact that living by them is inseparable
from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are - as members of this
family or city or nation or people, as bearers
of that history, as citizens of this republic'
(1996: 14). Where such loyalties and
responsibilities cannot be sustained, selfgovernment cannot survive. Hence the need
for a republican revival.
Others have reached this conclusion in
reaction to the tendency of many political
scientists and economists to think of politics
as a form of economic activity. In politics
and public affairs, according to this view
(e.g. Schumpeter, 1962; Downs, 1957), the
citizen is essentially a consumer. Political
parties offer candidates and platforms in
an attempt to win votes, and sensible
consumer-citizens vote so as to strike the
best bargain for themselves. If they decide
that the political market place offers nothing
appealing, or that their resources are better
invested elsewhere, consumer-citizens will
stay away from the ballot box and quite
wisely forsake political activity. They may
even find that it is rational for them to
remain largely ignorant of public affairs.
There is little that one vote can accomplish,
after all, so why waste time studying the
issues and assessing the candidates in order
to cast a meaningless vote? 8
This way of thinking about citizenship and politics is far removed from the
republican ideal of civic virtue. Conceiving
of the citizen as a consumer may capture the
legal dimension of citizenship, but there is
no room in this conception for the ethical,
integrative, or educative aspects of citizenship. Indeed, one republican response is to
say that the consumer-citizen is a citizen in
name only: 'Market theories of political
exchange which reduce the citizen to a
"consumer" or "customer" are not so much
amoral - although they are that too - as
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trivial: a reductio ad absurdum' (Selbourne,
1994: 14). 9
Republican critics also point to other
problems with the market model of politics,
notably the problem of generating obedience and allegiance. If citizens arc merely
consumers and the political order, like the
market, is merely a mechanism for coordinating and aggregating the citizens' preferences, there is no satisfactory answer to the
question, 'What reason has anyone to accept
the decision that emerges from the process
of interest-aggregation?' (Miller, 1989:
257). Appeals to solidarity or civic virtue
are not available to the advocates of the
market model, of course. In such a 'resolutely individualistic' conception of politics,
people 'are essentially competitors - rivals
for space, for resources, for power . . . The
only bonds between citizens arc contractual
in nature, formed by agreements based on
the self-interest of the parties involved'
(Spragens, 1990: 139-40). Where selfinterest does not dictate allegiance, there is
simply no reason to obey the law or remain
loyal.
To be sure, self-interest does dictate that
people obey the law when they are likely to
be punished if they do not. The proponents
of the market model may thus argue that
allegiance and cooperation are secured by
the coercive force of the government. When
obedience seems burdensome, however, the
law and those who enforce it will be
resented as obstacles, or even opponents,
that block the satisfaction of the consumercitizen's desires. Government and law soon
appear to be alien forces imposed on one not forms of self-rule but forces to be
circumvented whenever possible. As lawbreaking increases, and their own interests
suffer, consumer-citizens have no recourse
but to call for more police, more jails, and
more coercion. This reliance on coercion
reveals a most embarrassing problem for the
market model of politics: its inefficiency.
As Diego Gambetta observes, '[S]ocieties
which rely heavily on the use of force are
likely to be less efficient, more costly, and
more unpleasant than those where trust is
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maintained by other means. In the former,
resources tend to be diverted away from
economic undertakings and spent in coercion, surveillance, and information gathering, and less incentive is found to engage in
cooperative activities' (1988: 220-1). Such
inefficiency demonstrates how the market
model undermines itself. Citizens who think
of themselves as consumers will surely prize
efficiency. Yet the more citizens think of
themselves as consumers, the more likely
they are to rely on the inefficient means of
coercion to secure compliance with the
laws. On its own grounds, then, the conception of the citizen as consumer is inferior to
a conception of citizenship that generates
cooperation on the basis of solidarity and
civic duty. Such a conception will be, at
least to some extent, republican.
As with other revivals, in sum, the revival
of interest in republicanism and in citizenship grows out of the sense that something
valuable is in danger of being lost. That loss,
in this case, will have grievous consequences for political stability and individual
freedom, for one cannot be a free person, in
the republican view, unless one is a citizen
of a free, self-governing political community (Miller, 1991: 3). And such a community cannot be sustained unless a substantial
number of citizens (in the legal sense)
undertakes the active life of the publicspirited citizen.

THE RELEVANCE OF REPUBLICAN
CITIZENSHIP

There is a sense in which all revivals are
backward-looking, and one may wonder
whether the attempt to revive the republican
ideal of citizenship looks so far back - to the
Greek polis, the Roman civitas, and the
Italian city-republics of the Middle Ages as to be irrelevant to life in the twenty-first
century. Thomas Jefferson's agrarian
republicanism is a case in point. Jefferson
may have been right two hundred years ago
to praise the small farmer as the model of

the independent citizen who would rather
live frugally on land he and his family
worked than succumb to the luxury and
corruption of urban life (Jefferson, 1999:
549-50, 28). Such praise, however, seems
little more than nostalgia in today's world of
global agribusiness and 'e-commerce'.
What may be said, then, for the relevance of
republican citizenship today? What may be
said for it, moreover, in light of the biases
implicit in the republican ideal of the
property-owning, arms-bearing citizen?
We thus have two criticisms to consider
by way of concluding the case for republican citizenship in this chapter. The first is
that the republican conception of citizenship
is no longer realistic, if ever it was; the
second is that the conception poses a threat
to an open, egalitarian, and pluralistic
society. This second criticism is put forcefully by Iris Marion Young, who detects a
denial of 'difference' in republican attempts
to establish a 'civic public':
This ideal of the civic public ...
excludes women and other groups
defined as different, because its rational and universal status derives only
from its opposition to affectivity, particularity, and the body .... [I]n so far as
he is a citizen every man leaves behind
his particularity and difference, to
adopt a universal standpoint identical
for all citizens, the standpoint of the
common good or general will. In practice republican politicians enforced
homogeneity by excluding from citizenship all those defined as different. ..
(1990: 117).
Space does not permit a full consideration
of this criticism, but three points may be
made here. 10 One is that there is a strong
republican strain in the writings not only
of pioneering feminists, such as Mary
Wollstonecraft (1794), but also of some
recent feminists (e.g. Dietz, 1985, 1990). A
second point is that politics will be a tricky
business indeed if concern for difference
rules out attempts to find a common good.
Young wants 'claimants to justify their
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demands before others who explicitly stand
in different social locations' (1990: 190).
But how is a decision to emerge from the
conflicting claims of people in these 'different social locations' if no appeal to a
common good or to the standpoint of the
citizen is allowed? To be sure, Young's
point is that the search for common ground
serves to justify the dominance of a particular - and typically affluent, white, male group. But if there is no common good or
common ground, then it is difficult to see
how public decisions, including those of the
'heterogeneous public' she recommends
( 1990: 190), can be justified.
The third point concerns the claim that
citizenship involves a false ideal of impartiality. Here the republican response is to
deny that the ideal is false. We should
indeed strive to think and act, when establishing laws and policies, as members of the
public rather than self-interested individuals. But this does not mean that we cannot
take account of the particular needs and
interests of the people - even people who
'stand in different social locations' - who
compose the polity. Republican citizenship,
again, is integrative. It requires us to bring
together the facets of our individual lives as
best we can. In working toward policies and
laws that we can agree to despite our differences, citizenship also helps us to find unity
in the midst of diversity. But it does not
require that we surrender our particular
identities or deny the value of diversity.
That is not to say that 'difference' and
cultural pluralism do not present difficulties
for a 'civic public', for they do. But difference and pluralism present difficulties for
all kinds of polities, and republican citizenship at least has the virtue of confronting
them head on by encouraging people to look
for the common ground on which they
stand, despite their differences, as citizens.
In that respect, there is surely something to
be said for the relevance of republican
citizenship.
There is also something to be said in
response to the first criticism - that
republican citizenship is an irredeemably
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nostalgic ideal in this age of globalization.
In this case the republican response is to
point out that fear of dependence and hatred
of corruption are still very much with us,
and one need not be the yeoman farmer of
Jefferson's vision to enjoy the kind of independence necessary to republican citizenship. The challenge is to find ways to adapt
these enduring republican concerns to the
circumstances of vast polities that are themselves entangled in a 'global economy
whose frenzied flow of money and goods,
information and images, pays little heed to
nations, much less neighborhoods' (Sandel,
1996: 317). To those who would take up this
challenge, republicanism offers guidance of
both a general and a particular kind.
In general, the republican advice is to build
community. Among other things, this means
that a republican cannot be a wholehearted
cosmopolitan (Miller, 1999; Dagger, 2001).
To be a citizen, in the republican view, is to
be a partner in a common enterprise, and
people will be likely to put the common
interest ahead of their own - to act as true
citizens - only when they feel themselves to
be part of such an enterprise. The Internet and
satellite television are unlikely to inspire this
sense of community on a global basis.
The republican, however, will also note
that genuine communities come in many
different forms, not all of which are
hospitable to the republican ideal of selfgovernment. Republicanism thus points
toward particular characteristics to be cultivated in political communities. Indeed, we
may say that the republican model of the
good community exhibits the following five
characteristics: fair treatment under the rule
of law prevails; economic arrangements and
the distribution of wealth promote citizenship rather than consumerism; preparing
children for a life of responsible citizenship
is a leading aim of education; civic design
strengthens neighborhoods and public spirit;
and opportunities for participation in public
affairs, including programs of civic service,
are abundant.
Much more needs to be said on each of
these five points, of course, to clarify and
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bolster the case for republican citizenship.
That so much may be said, however, and
that neo-republicans and republican liberals

are now beginning to say it, is perhaps the
best testimony to the continuing relevance
of the republican ideal of citizenship.
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